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Computers have long been utilised in the legal environment. The main use of computers
however, has merely been to automate office tasks. More exciting is the prospect of using
artificial intelligence (AI) technology to create computers that can emulate the substantive
legal jobs performed by lawyers, to create computers that can autonomously reason with the
law to determine legal solutions, for example: structuring and support of Partnership for
Peace (PjP) mandate. Such attempts have not been successful jet. Modelling the law and
emulating the processes of legal reasoning have proved to be more complex and subtle than
originally envisaged. The adoption by AI researchers specialising in law of new AI techniques,
such as case based reasoning, neural networks, fuzzy logic, deontic logics and non-monotonic
logics, may move closer to achieving an automation of legal reasoning. Unfortunately these
approaches also suffer several drawbacks that will need to be overcome if this is to be
achieved. Even if these new techniques do not achieve an automation of legal reasoning
however, they will still be valuable in better automating office tasks and in providing insights
about the nature of law.An idea to apply the technology of intelligent multi-agent systems to
the computer aided learning (CAL) in law, is currently being developed as a research project
by the author of this article (see e.g. [Antolis, 2002.]). Similar projects are usually based on
the most modern technologies of multimedia and hypermedia, as it was implemented in this
article. The theoretical foundations of the design and architecture of intelligent system for
decision support process in law and distance-learning environment are, however,
at their early stage of development.
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Computers have long been utilised in the
sphere oflaw. Basic applications such as word proc-
essors, spreadsheets and databases have all found
their way into legal offices. Recently, more sophisti-
cated tools such as computerised legal research sys-
tems, document drafting packages, and practice man-
agement systems have become increasingly common.
Most exciting however, has been the prospect of us-
ing artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to create
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'automated legal reasoning systems', computer sys-
tems that reason with and apply the law in an effort
to resolve legal disputes. Examples of such systems
include legal expert systems.
However, the practical benefits of such auto-
mated reasoning systems have fallen short of early
optimistic predictions; they have not resulted in com-
puter systems that can independently and inexpen-
sively provide expert advice about substantive law.
The failure of efforts to create automated le-
gal reasoners has led to a reassessment and reclassi-
fication of research aims. The key objective has been
transformed into the creation of 'knowledge based
systems'. The purpose of a knowledge based system
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is not necessarily autonomously to provide solutions
to legal problems. Instead, the goal is to incorporate
legal knowledge and reasoning strategies into the
automation of legal tasks so as to make the systems
that perform those tasks more productive. I This goal
is far less grand than that for automated legal
reasoners.
In addition to this change of focus, new ap-
proaches in AI have recently emerged. These new
approaches may overcome some of the limitations
inherent in earlier attempts to automate legal rea-
soning. What general benefits these new approaches
might provide, and what specific benefits knowledge
based systems might provide in law is open to ex-
amination.
The interest in the systems of intelligent sys-
tem for decision support process in law and distance
learning environment (DLE) in law, and self-learn-
ing in general, is stimulated by the growing popular-
ity and easy access to the World Wide Web. The ex-
pressive capabilities of HTML and its support by
the popular browsers makes it available to provide
on-line courses of deep complexity. It is generally
agreed (see e.g. [Gorodetsky, 1996; O'Hare and
Jennings, 1996]), that at least three important issues
should constitute the basis for such learning systems:
they are expected to be distributed, intelligent and
adaptive. The adaptability of IDLE systems, in all
meanings of this concept, is announced in most of
currently developed projects, but usually weakly
implemented in practice. Adaptation and learning in
multi-agent systems establishes a relatively new but
significant topic in Artificial Intelligence (AI). Multi-
agent systems typically are very complex and hard
to specify in their behaviour. It is therefore broadly
agreed in both the Distributed Al and the related
communities that there is the need to endow these
systems with the ability to adapt and learn, that is, to
self-improve their future performance. There may
be at least two different kinds of adaptation: purely
engineering one, related to the situation, as mentioned
above, when a program is able to change its behav-
iour in changing context regardless of the nature of
the latter; and one arising from Human-Computer
Interaction (HCI) issues (see e.g. [Gavrilova and
Voinov, 1995]), which concern a program adjusting
its behaviour to meet the user's expectations and
peculiarities according to some reasonable strategy.
The second, HCI-related kind of adaptation is
crucial for any tutoring system. It is evident, that a
qualified tutor works differently with different stu-
dents, regardless of possibly equal "marks" of the
latter. This issue is even more important for distance
learning systems, in which the online contact with
human tutor is lost.
Therefore, one of the main directions of the
described project is to investigate possible strategies
of the automatic adaptation of a DL system, based
on the concept of Student Model (see e.g. [Gavrilova
and Voinov, 1995; Gavrilova et al., 1996]) and the
corresponding Learning Process Model. In contrast
to cited papers, these models are supposed not to
function separately, but to form an "agent model" in
the meaning of (see e.g. [Shoham, 1993]). These in-
vestigations are accompanied by the building of adap-
tive DL system IDLE (Intelligent Distance Learning
Environment) that will be implemented for the de-
velopment of adaptive courseware on WWW in the
fields of intelligent system for decision support proc-
ess in law and law sciences.
Before examining these questions however, it
is worthwhile exploring the failure of early attempts
to automate legal reasoning.
2. Automated legal reasoning
As we have seen, early attempts to automate
legal reasoning involved the creation of legal expert
systems. Expert systems contain knowledge and rea-
soning strategies such that the computer can apply
the knowledge to problems in order to determine a
solution. However, these early legal expert systems
tended to be developed with scant regard for juris-
prudence (see e.g. [Susskind 1987]).
In an expert system, knowledge is stored in
the system in the form of 'production rules'. These
rules take the form
If (condition) then (result)
For example
If (mens rea for murder) and (actus reus for
murder) then (guilty of murder)
reasoning in such production rule systems is a
process of applying the rules stored in the system,
by satisfying the clauses of the production rules. This
representation of legal knowledge has a superficial
appeal if one believes that the law is no more than a
series of defined rules which lawyers and judges sim-
ply apply to a problem to determine a solution. While,
superficially, this may appear to be what occurs when
lawyers reason about the law, this view of law is, in
fact, only subscribed to by extreme legal positivists
(see e.g. [Zeleznikow & Hunter 1994]).
The jurisprudentially assumptions inherent in
the 'production rule' approach to modelling legal
knowledge results in numerous difficulties. How does
one determine whether a situation is within the am-
bit of a rule? What happens if no clear rule can be
found that governs the situation? What if rules con-
flict? In common law legal systems these and other
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similar problems are, at least partially, resolved by
reference to previously decided cases; a process for-
malised in the doctrine of stare decisis.
Prima facie, reference to and reasoning from
cases presents problems for production rule systems.
Such reference requires the legal expert system to
incorporate, at the least, analogical reasoning." Pro-
duction rule systems can only incorporate an ap-
proach based on deductive reasoning. As such, this
severely limits the ability of production rule systems
to model the law and emulate legal reasoning. Early
legal expert systems failed to achieve their goal be-
cause they did not account for the complexity and
subtlety of the law and of legal reasoning.
3. Alternatives to production rules
In the quest to create intelligent computer sys-
tems, AI researchers have investigated numerous al-
ternatives to production rule expert systems. How-
ever, those researchers specialising in AI and law
applications have, so far, only explored a few of these
techniques. Those that have been examined include:
case based reasoners; artificial neural networks (neu-
ral nets); fuzzy logics, deontic logics and non-
monotonic logics (see e.g. [Zeleznikow & Hunter
1994)). To determine whether any of these ap-
proaches can aid in the creation of automated legal
reasoners, we must first examine the jurisprudentially
assumptions inherent in the way that law is mod-
elled with each of these alternatives.
4. Case based reasoners
In stark contrast to the methods used to model
legal knowledge adopted in production rule systems,
Figure 1.
Stored case
case based reasoners do not rely on there being rules
of law. Instead, in a case based reasoning system, as
the name implies, one or more individual examples
are stored by the system.' The case based reasoner
then manipulates the cases in its knowledge base so
as to reach a conclusion when given a concrete prob-
lem. In this way case based reasoners have been cre-
ated that not only argue to a solution, but also present
an 'argument' as to why the solution should occur,
highlight weak points in the argument presented and
indicate what likely responses the opposition will
raise.
Capturing legal knowledge in this way has
intuitive appeal considering the importance of cases
and judge made law contained in cases, in common
law legal systems. In applying cases and construct-
ing arguments from cases, case based reasoners ap-
pear to incorporate analogical reasoning. Thus, po-
tentially, they appear able to overcome some of the
problems that plague production rule based attempts
to automate legal reasoning.
Unfortunately this has not proved completely
true. To be able to reason analogically, a person or
computer system must be able to decide when two
cases are similar enough for an analogy to be cre-
ated between them (see e.g. [Mital and Johnson
1992]). How is this done? The mechanics of this
process are uncertain in humans. Researchers in
fields such as psychology and cognitive science give
differing accounts. Whilst theories abound, none is
overwhelmingly accepted (see e.g. [Mital and
Johnson 1992]).
In case based reasoners, the process of simi-
larity determination and analogy formation occurs
by breaking down a situation into 'factors'. These
factors are pre-determined by the programmer of the
case based reasoning system. When presented with
a problem situation, the case based reasoning sys-
Problem situation
t-actor I t-actor I
Factor 2
Factor 3 Factor 3
f=;lrt()r 4 f=;lrt()r 4
Factor 5
Factor N Factor N
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tern also breaks it down in terms of these factors (see
e.g. [Ashley 1989]). In this way, the case and the
problem situation can be compared for the presence
or absence of factors. The number of factors shared
results in a measure of how similar one case or situ-
ation is to another,"
From here analogies can be created and ma-
nipulated. Determining in what ways the cases are
similar and in what ways they differ in turn allows
the construction of likely arguments for and against
a given proposition.
In this way, case based reasoners appear to
emulate legal analogical reasoning; cases are com-
pared with each other and the similarities and differ-
ences between them are used as the basis for the con-
struction of arguments. However, as will be argued
subsequently, what such systems actually implement
is only a crude approximation of analogical reason-
mg.
5. Neural nets
Neural nets operate in a similar, but subtly
different way to case based reasoners.' Like case
based reasoners, neural nets do not operate with le-
gal rules, but with legal cases.
A neural net is a computer model that is in-
spired by and that mimics the structure of a biologi-
cal nervous system, particularly the human brain. AI
researchers hope that by mimicking the underlying
structure of an undeniably intelligent system, they
will also be able to emulate the intelligent behaviour
Figure 2.
Factor 1
of that system. In computer science, neural nets have
proved exceptionally good at many tasks which have
confounded expert systems; such as computer vision,
speech recognition and handwriting recognition.
Notably, all these tasks involve the recognition and
classification of patterns, a by-product of the fact
that neural nets are inherently suited to tasks involv-
ing recognising and classifying patterns.
Identifying patterns between circumstances
and classifying those patterns ostensibly appears to
be what is occurring when an analogy is formed. Two
cases will only be regarded as similar if they share
some sufficiently close pattern of facts. Researchers
in AI and law have thus viewed neural nets as a prom-
ising technique with which to emulate legal analogi-
cal reasoning; their ability to match patterns could
be used to match cases with each other and with prob-
lem situations.
Unfortunately, like cased based reasoners the
use of neural nets is problematic. This will be dis-
cussed shortly.
6. Fuzzy logic based systems
Another alternative to the production rule sys-
tems which we discussed above are fuzzy produc-
tion rule systems; systems that use fuzzy logic. In
contrast to the classical logic on which traditional
expert systems are based, fuzzy logic is said to be
able to deal with imprecision and partial truths. The
originator of fuzzy logic, Zadeh, thought fuzzy logic
would be able to model the imprecision inherent in
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'linguistic variables'. Law is replete with such lin-
guistic variables, making it a seemingly attractive
field for the application of fuzzy logic. However, the
use offuzzy logic in law has been criticised by some
AI and law researchers who claim that its philosophi-
cal basis is uncertain when applied to legal concepts
(see e.g. [Bench-Capon & Sergot 1988]). It does seem
doubtful whether merely using fuzzy logic to extend
production rule systems provides much benefit. This
does not address many of the underlying
jurisprudentially problems which are inherent in pro-
duction rule systems; notably the reliance on deduc-
tive reasoning. However, the potential benefit of in-
corporating fuzzy logic into case based reasoners and
hybrid reasoning systems (systems that incorporate
multiple reasoning strategies) remains to be explored
in detail.
7. Deontic logic based systems
Unlike traditional logic, fuzzy logic, case
based reasoners or neural nets, deontic logic is con-
cerned with explicitly modelling the normative as-
pects oflaws. In traditional production rule systems,
laws are merely 'if ... then ... ' statements with no ex-
plicit moral content. However, it is argued that it is
necessary to account for the normative aspect of law
if the law is to be successfully modelled (see e.g.
[McCarty 1989]). Deontic logic aims to explore the
relationships between normative aspects of the law.
Attempts to utilise deontic logic to create au-
tomated legal reasoning systems are at an early stage
and have not been completely successful. The use of
deontic logic has also endured weighty criticism.
However, like approaches based on fuzzy logic, the
uses of deontic logic remain to be fully explored and
the future benefit that such approaches may provide
remains as yet unpredictable.
8. Non-monotonic logic based
systems
A feature of traditional logic, fuzzy logics, and
deontic logics is that once a statement is found to be
true under the system, the addition of new facts or
statements to the system will not alter that earlier
finding. This is known as monotonicity. However,
an important feature of human reasoning is its con-
tingent nature; results are always subject to falsifi-
cation by new information. Emulating this aspect of
human reasoning is desirable. Non-monotonic rea-
soning systems attempt to do this. In contrast to
monotonic reasoning systems, the addition of new
facts or statements to a non-monotonic reasoning
system can alter earlier findings. The contingent na-
ture of non-monotonic logics thus seems a promis-
ing addition to techniques for describing legal knowl-
edge. Like fuzzy logic and deontic logics however,
the use of non-monotonic logics in automating legal
reasoning has not been comprehensively explored
and so its benefits are uncertain.
Thus, while case based reasoners, neural nets
and the various logics discussed above provide al-
ternatives to production rules, AI and law research-
ers have only explored the use of case based reasoners
and neural nets in any detail. The application of case
based reasoning and neural net techniques is, how-
ever, subject to several problems.
9. Problems with case based
reasoners and neural nets
At first glance, both case based reasoners and
neural nets appear extremely attractive for use in
automated legal reasoning systems; their primafacie
ability to emulate analogical reasoning should allow
them to overcome some of the problems experienced
with production rule systems. Unfortunately, this has
not proved unequivocally true. While both case based
reasoners and neural nets can match similar cases
with each other, this is achieved at a low level of
complexity. As previously mentioned, similarity is
only found by testing for the presence or absence of
predefined factors.
While researchers may not know all that is
involved in the process of analogising by humans,
even a superficial examination shows that the proc-
ess involves more than the mere comparison of the
presence or absence of predefined factors. Any simi-
larity perceived between situations depends on the
context in which the situations are viewed. The very
factors that are considered relevant in the finding of
similarity is dependent on the context under which
the comparison is being made (see e.g. [Tito 1987]).
Thus the ability to create an analogy, is determined
by the context under which the similarity is deter-
mined.
Just as importantly, the process of analogis-
ing depends not only on linking situations as simi-
lar, but also moulding the analogy made in a direc-
tion desired for the outcome of an argument. Again
however, the way that an analogy is manipulated
depends on its context, on one's viewpoint and the
outcome that one wants to achieve. Thus, as several
jurisprudes note, analogising is inherently depend-
ent on the overall purposes that the legal system is
trying to achieve (see e.g. [MacCormick 1978]). The
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classification of facts for the purposes of creating
analogies occurs in a whole body of knowledge and
theory we use to make sense of the world. When
deciding between competing fact classifications and
competing arguments, our evaluation inherently in-
volves considering the consequences of each out-
come on our model of the world. In this sense, simi-
larities, dissimilarities, classifications and thus the
existence of analogies is made and not found.
For these reasons, breaking cases and prob-
lem situations into predefined categories is neces-
sarily a far less subtle method of analogy making
than that which occurs during human legal reason-
ing. Even disregarding any of the practical and tech-
nical difficulties in doing SO,6 while case based
reasoners and neural nets can mimic analogical rea-
soning, the result is crude.







10. The Architecture of Intelligent
Distance Learning Environment
The software implementation of the IDLE pro-
totype may be regarded as: multi-agent, portable,
access-restricted and using multimedia effects. Sys-
tem contains both the modules of traditional (iso-
lated) architecture, which examples are tutor's and
system administrator's workbenches, and the mod-
ules of multi-agent architecture, which implements
e.g. system supervising, immediate control over
learning. Among the agents comprising the system,
are those, which may be regarded as "classic" (see
e.g. [Takaoka, Okamoto, 1997]):
- Expert Tutor. Expert Tutor controls the
learning process, applies different education strate-
gies according to the cognitive and essential personal
features of the student, together with his/her educa-
tional "progress". Interacts with Interface Engineer
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- Interface Engineer. Interface Engineer
maintains User Model for current student (both by
the preliminary testing and dynamically during the
student's working with the system) and provides it
to the human users and to the other agents. In par-
ticular this information is used in choosing the sce-
nario of the presentation of courseware and evaluat-
ing the student progress and his/her assessment.
- Domain Expert (Domain Assistant). Do-
main Expert accumulates and provides knowledge
on subject domain, maintains testing exercises, pro-
vides these data to its users and other agents, analy-
ses the students "feedback" in domain terms.
Such system architecture may be regarded as
a development of a traditional for AI idea of "active
knowledge bases": each of the knowledge base com-
ponents is access via corresponding agent, which
adapts knowledge to the context of usage. Further-
more, a close analogue of the agent-mediated knowl-
edge bases is seen in the works of [van Harmelin,
1992] where a knowledge base with reflection was
developed. It has both domain knowledge and some
meta-knowledge about its integrity, and could apply
this in reasoning. Certainly some close analogies of
these techniques are seen also in the field of
databases, especially object-oriented ones [Cattell,
1991] .
11. Adaptive tutoring
IDLE's adaptability is twofold. The main is
scenario adaptability which is controlled by expert
tutor who produced different hypertext navigation
rules for different students according their user/stu-
dent models. In contrast to the traditional mode of
hypertext navigation, when the default routes are
embedded into the page, in the described system the
navigation is guided by the expert tutor, who restricts
the navigation freedom, and puts "barriers". It does
not allow student to move to those places of course,
where his/her visit is unreasonable (according to the
strategy and the target of learning). For this, all the
domain material is stratified into "clusters", contain-
ing one or more hypertext nodes and representing
"learning units". The set of clusters, which nodes
were visited by the student during all his/her learn-
ing sessions, is called "scope of visibility" and oc-
curs as a union of both already and currently learned
material. The navigation within the scope of vi sibil-
ity is unrestricted. To widen the scope of visibility,
the student should overcome a "barrier", which pro-
vides some examination test. The interface adapt-
ability is guided by the interface engineer who may
change the main interface parameters according to
the individual students' attitudes and preferences
[Gavrilova, Voinov, 1995].
12. Conclusion
Given all the limitations discussed above, one
might conclude that AI has nothing to offer lawyers.
However, it is the author's view that this would be a
hasty conclusion. .
Whilst the early hopes of researchers in AI
and law - the creation of automated legal reasoning
systems - have not have been fulfilled, such efforts
have been far from fruitless. While case based
reasoners and neural nets are also incapable of pro-
viding realistic automated legal reasoning systems,
these approaches do provide a more sophisticated
emulation oflegal reasoning than do production rule
systems.
However, with the refocusing of effort into
creating legal knowledge based systems, the benefits
of applying AI techniques to the law become more
apparent. Once the goal is no longer primarily to cre-
ate automated legal reasoners, but rather to build le-
gal knowledge based systems, even the production
rule approach to computerising legal knowledge may
still be useful. The utilisation of case based reason-
ing and neural net approaches provide additional
benefits.' The incorporation of production rules, case
based reasoners, neural nets and perhaps alternative
logics into hybrid knowledge based systems holds
promise. The introduction of these AI techniques into
existing computer applications may greatly improve
the sophistication and utility of such existing sys-
tems. Either approach may lead us to exciting appli-
cations yet to be envisaged.
So, while the goal of producing a truly intelli-
gent computer system that can automatically reason
with law is beyond the realms of possibility at
present, research continues. Even if this holy grail is
never reached, the insights gained may, none-the-
less, still provide immediate great benefits to law-
yers and the legal system.
And at last but not least, we try to build and
suggest the perceivable architecture of intelligent
system for decision support process in law and dis-
tance learning environment, for developing such sys-
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